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EVA, HARTMANN AND RAD ON
KULLBACK-LEIBLER MINIMIZATION
Abstract. We address problems with a recent attempt by Eva,
Hartmann and Rad to justify the Kullback-Leibler divergence min-
imization solution to van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin problem.
A preprint of Eva, Hartmann and Rad (2019) touts the virtues of van
Fraassen’s (1981) solution of the Judy Benjamin Problem by Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence minimization. The paper is forthcoming in
Mind and deeply flawed. I’ll restrict my discussion to the latter point.
In fact, I’ll restrict my discussion to a section of the paper that is
spoken of in that paper’s introduction as follows:1
we present an analysis of van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin
example in terms of f -divergence minimization and note
that different f -divergences give rise to different updates,
none of which is obviously superior to its competitors. In
order to resolve this impasse, we then appeal to resources
from epistemic utility theory to identify a particular f -
divergence (the Kullback-Leibler divergence) as the unique
probabilistic distance measure that agents should utilize if
they hope to achieve maximally accurate beliefs....
The portion of the argument outlined above runs as follows. Let W be a
set of worlds and let JS(Q,w) denote inaccuracy of credence function Q
at world w according to some proper scoring rule, e.g. the logarithmic
scoring rule, which is given by JL(Q,w) = − log(Q(w)). Define
expS(Q|P ) =
∑
w∈W
P (W ) · JS(Q,w),
i.e. the expectaton of the inaccuracy of Q from the perspective of P .
Eva, Hartmann and Rad now consider the following putative norm:
1In particular, I won’t devote space in the main text to the fact that the authors
follow a recent trend of treating sentences such as “If you are in Red Territory, then
the odds are 3 : 1 that you are in Second Company area” as indicative conditionals.
I don’t believe that they can be conditionals of any sort, because I don’t believe that
any proposition can be said to serve as consequent. They’re more plausibly just
instances of a common form of vernacular for reporting conditional probabilities.
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Diachronic Accuracy Norm (Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010):
Suppose that at time t1 an agent’s prior credences are em-
bodied by the probability distribution P , and that between
times t1 and t2, she learns new information which imposes a
constraint C on her posterior credences at time t2. Then at
time t2 the agent should adopt credences encoded by a prob-
ability distribution Q such that (i) Q satisfies C, and (ii) for
any Q′ that satisfies C, expS(Q|P ) ≤ expS(Q′|P ), where JS
is one’s chosen proper scoring rule.
Eva, Hartmann and Rad go on to say:
In particular, the diachronic accuracy norm requires agents to
adopt the posterior probability distribution Q that minimizes
the quantity expS(Q|P )− expS(P |P ). (. . .) When JS = JL,
expS(Q|P ) − expS(P |P ) is equal to the KL-divergence be-
tween Q and P .
But the KL-divergence between Q and P is defined by
DKL(Q|P ) = −
∑
w∈W
Q(w) log
(P (w)
Q(w)
)
.
Eva, Hartmann and Rad are therefore mistaken. When JS = JL,
expS(Q|P )− expS(P |P ) = −
∑
w∈W
P (W )
(
log
Q(w)
P (w)
)
,
which is not the KL-divergence between Q and P at all, but rather the
KL-divergence between P and Q, i.e. the so called “IKL-divergence”
(for Inverse Kullback-Leibler) between Q and P .
In other words, under logarithmic scoring the Diachronic Accuracy
Norm recommends minimization of the IKL-divergence between the
posterior Q and the prior P (a method somewhat cautiously put forth
by Douven and Romeijn 2012 as a method of updating in Judy Ben-
jamin type problems), not minimization of the KL-divergence between
Q and P (the method employed by van Fraassen 1981, and the one that
Eva, Hartmann and Rad are attempting to advocate for in their paper).
A norm that would recommend minimization of the KL-divergence be-
tween Q and P would look more like this:
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Alternate Diachronic Accuracy Norm: Suppose that
at time t1 an agent’s prior credences are embodied by the
probability distribution P , and that between times t1 and t2,
she learns new information which imposes a constraint C on
her posterior credences at time t2. Then at time t2 the agent
should adopt credences encoded by a probability distribution
Q such that (i) Q satisfies C, and (ii) for any Q′ that satisfies
C, expS(P |Q) − expS(Q|Q) ≤ expS(P |Q′) − expS(Q′|Q′),
where JS is one’s chosen proper scoring rule.
In the terminology of Reinhard Selten, the Alternate Diachronic Accu-
racy Norm says that one should minimize the expected score loss of the
prior P at the posterior Q. In other words, one should choose one’s pos-
terior in such a way that one’s prior comes out as accurate as possible
relative to (and from the perspective of) the posterior. If the Alternate
Diachronic Accuracy Norm were in fact normative, it would provide the
argument Eva, Hartmann and Rad desire. Of course, if these authors
employed the Diachronic Accuracy Norm in the first place because they
had independent reason for thinking it was a good norm, this option
won’t appeal to them. But if they were just using it because it was in
the literature and they thought it gave them what they wanted, they
shouldn’t mind switching to the alternate norm. Especially now that
it’s in the literature, too. (You can find it near the top of this page.)
And, to be sure, the alternate norm is the more plausible of the two.
The Diachronic Accuracy Norm actually makes no sense whatsoever;
why would one treat one’s prior P as actual in the process of replacing
it by a presumably superior posterior Q? In accepting constraint C, one
has already acknowledged that P doesn’t give the right probabilities. In
a case where no probability distribution that’s even close to P meets the
constraint, P may in fact be known already to be a very bad estimate of
the right probabilities. So no calculation of an “expected” inaccuracy
that takes P as actual is going to give meaningful results.
But in any event the Alternate Diachronic Accuracy Norm can’t be
normative, either. For one thing, the constraint C plainly needs to
be a convex set. Even if we fix that issue, however, it still can’t be
normative. Suppose for example that we toss a biased coin (it lands
heads a third of the time). You go into another room and ask God
some question providing you with indirect evidence as to how the coin
landed. (What sort of question exactly I don’t know...maybe something
like “did either the coin land heads or the Mets win last night?” That
sort of thing.) You emerge and I ask you “So...does your credence in
heads now lie in the interval [.5, .7]? You say “yes”. If I think you
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are ideally rational and know more than I do, I should defer to your
credence in heads. So what I have learned constrains my credence
in heads to the convex set [.5, .7]. But on any reasonable distance
measure (e.g. expected score loss), the credence function assigning
heads probability .5 is “closest”, among those meeting the constraint,
to my current function. Should I then update my credence in heads to
.5? No...to do so would imply that I think your credence in heads is
exactly .5 with probability 1. What I should rather do is update my
credence to the expectation of yours, conditional on the constraint.
Of course what makes expected score loss (or any other plausible dis-
tance) minimization intuitively wrong here is that the nearest point is
an extreme point of the constraint region. When the nearest point is
safely in the interior and plausibly near the centroid of our distribution
over the credences of the expert one defers to, updating to the near-
est point might seem less “intuitively wrong”. But having the nearest
point fall close to the centroid is really just an accident of geometry.
There’s not really any philosophical reason to think that one should
update to the nearest point–one should of course update to the cen-
troid of the distribution. That is, one’s posterior credence should be
the expectation that one assigns to the expert’s credence.2
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